Mental Accounting as Self-Regulation: Representativeness to Goal-Derived Categories. [Übersetzung von: Mentale Kontoführung als Selbstregulierung. Repräsentativität für zielgeleitete Kategorien] by Brendl, C. Miguel et al.
First published in Zeitschrift für Sozialpsychologie,1998, Vol. 29, pp. 89-104. Translated from German by permission of Hans Huber Verlag, Bern, Switzerland. 




Mental Accounting as Self-Regulation:  
Representativeness to Goal-Derived Categories  
 
C. Miguel Brendl 
Universität Konstanz 
Arthur B. Markman and E. Tory Higgins 
Columbia University 
 
When making decisions, people group gains and losses. The way they choose to form these 
groupings, called "mental accounting", affects their decisions. Mental accounting is a power-
ful and intuitively compelling phenomenon. To this point, however, little attention has been 
devoted to the psychological principles that underlie mental accounting. In this article we 
explore the psychological processes that set up mental accounts and assign gains or losses to 
these accounts. We propose that (a) currently active goals set up mental accounts, and (b) 
gains and losses are weighted into these accounts proportionally to their representativeness 
to the goal that set up the account.  We review existing evidence that supports this goals-
representativeness view of mental accounting and describe new studies designed to test these 
proposals.  We also review other choice phenomena (e.g., sunk costs and entrapment) in 
which mental accounting is involved.  We suggest that mental accounting is a useful self-
regulatory strategy, despite the fact that it can sometimes lead to irrational choices. 
 




When the Internal Revenue Service audits a business, 
they rely on Generally Accepted Accounting Principles 
(GAAP) to interpret the business’s financial statements.  
Similarly, psychologists trying to understand how people 
keep track of the psychological costs and benefits1 asso-
ciated with a decision must know the "generally ac-
cepted mental accounting principles".  In contrast to the 
fiscal GAAP the mental principles of  dealing with costs 
and benefits appear at first somewhat disorganized  as 
people appear quite willing to separate and recombine 
psychological costs and benefits into mental accounts in 
order to minimize the pain of the costs and to fully enjoy 
the benefits (Linville & Fischer, 1991).  We suggest that 
mental accounting is not chaotic, but rather it is a mani-
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1 In business administration the terms profit, income/ reve-
nue, utility, loss, expense and cost are reserved for clearly 
defined and separable functions. In this paper we do not adhere 
to these definitions because in our view people account, for 
example, specific gains as well as psychological - not necessar-
ily monetary - utility.  We do not make any statements about a 
separation of these terms within mental accounting. 
festation of an important self-regulatory strategy. 
In the context of consumer choice, mental accounting 
occurs when the decision to make a purchase is influ-
enced by other concurrent or prior purchases.  In other 
words, consumer choices are often not made in isolation 
of previous choices and mental accounting is the under-
lying principle.  One well-known example is Tversky 
and Kahneman’s (1981; Kahneman & Tversky, 1984) 
theater ticket vignette.  In their study, all participants 
were told that they had decided to go to the theater.  
Some participants were asked if they would buy a sec-
ond $10 theater ticket after discovering that they had lost 
the first one.  Other participants were asked if they 
would buy a $10 theater ticket after discovering that they 
had lost a $10 bill.  Many more participants indicated 
that they would be willing to buy a ticket after having 
lost the $10 bill than after having lost the theater ticket.  
Kahneman and Tversky suggest that the lost ticket is 
placed into a mental "theater ticket account" driving up 
the cost of the theater visit from $10 to $20.  In contrast, 
the lost $10 is not placed into the same account as the 
theater ticket.  Thus, participants in the lost ticket condi-
tion are integrating the cost of a new ticket with the 
previous loss, but participants in the lost money condi-
tion are not. 
In a second example in a consumer choice setting, 
Tversky and Kahneman (1981; see also Thaler, 1980) 
told participants that they were purchasing a calculator 
and a jacket from a store.  The calculator cost $25, and 
the jacket cost $120.  Some participants were told that if 
they drove 20 minutes to a new store, they could save 
$15 on the calculator.  Other participants were told that 
if they drove 20 minutes to a new store, they could save 
$15 on the jacket.  Participants were more likely to de-
cide to go to the new store to save money on the calcula-
tor than on the jacket.  This finding only makes sense if 
the costs of the jacket and the calculator are being placed 
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into separate accounts and the savings is being applied 
only to the account corresponding to the item receiving 
the discount. 
The theater ticket and calculator/jacket scenarios are 
intuitively compelling.  Further, the basic explanation of 
separate mental accounts provides a plausible explana-
tion of participants' choice process.  There are two gaps 
in the mental accounting view, however.  First, it is not 
clear how people decide when to lump two items into the 
same account and when to keep them separate. Second, 
there is a need for principles that elucidate how much 
weight an event is given in a mental account.  For exam-
ple, instead of entering a lost theater ticket with a weight 
of "1" and lost cash with a weight of "0" (i.e., not ac-
counting it at all in the theater ticket account), the lost 
ticket might be given more weight in the theater ticket 
account than the lost cash.  In this paper, we will pro-
pose a solution for these gaps.  To support these propos-
als, we review published evidence and report some pre-
viously unpublished studies that we conducted to address 
these unresolved issues. We seek to advance our under-
standing for the psychological processes underlying 
mental accounting in order to better predict actual choice 
behavior in consumer situations. 
We begin by characterizing the assumptions of the 
original mental accounting view which implies that 
mental accounts are discrete entities.  Then, we extend 
the mental accounting framework by introducing two 
hypotheses that go beyond the original model.  First, we 
suggest that mental accounts are categories that are 
organized around active goals.  Second, we assume that 
people use the representativeness heuristic in order to 
assign and weight events into mental accounts.  We call 
this view the goals-representativeness model. 
 
Discrete Mental Accounts 
 
Tversky and Kahneman (1981; Kahneman & Tversky, 
1984) suggested that people group certain acts and 
events into mental accounts.  When deciding whether to 
take an action, they evaluate the action relative to the 
groupings (i.e., accounts) they have formed. Kahneman 
and Tversky suggest that accounts have different levels 
of inclusiveness.  The least inclusive mental accounts, so 
called minimal accounts, include only the direct conse-
quences of an act.  Thus, minimal accounts do not in-
clude prior gains or losses, such as a lost theater ticket.  
Kahneman and Tversky (1984)  propose "that people 
will spontaneously frame decisions in terms of [more 
inclusive] 'topical accounts' that, in the context of deci-
sion making, play a role analogous to that of 'good 
forms' in perception and of basic-level categories in 
cognition." (p. 347) 
In addition to the evidence for the existence of mental 
accounting cited above, there is evidence that people’s 
mental accounts can often be more inclusive than a 
minimal account. Specifically, people often take gains 
and losses associated with past events into consideration 
when making a decision involving future events (Arkes 
& Blumer, 1985; Laughhunn & Payne, 1984; Thaler, 
1980; Thaler & Johnson, 1985). Thus, when people 
decide whether to take an action, they consider more 
than just the direct consequences of that act, often inte-
grating prior events with the consequences of the current 
one.  Economists suggest that the consideration of prior 
gains and losses (called sunk costs) is an irrational 
choice strategy because the evaluation of each new event 
should not be influenced by prior gains and losses 
(Laughhunn & Payne, 1984; Thaler & Johnson, 1990; 
though see Tan and Yates, 1995).  Intuitively, the ration-
ale for ignoring sunk costs is that because a present 
choice can only affect future outcomes, it should only be 
evaluated in terms of its unique effects on future out-
comes, that is, regardless of past actions taken by the 
decision maker. 
In sum, a number of assumptions seem to characterize 
the original or discrete mental accounting model. First, 
in choice situations, people represent the choice in terms 
of a topical account (Kahneman & Tversky, 1984).  
Each "topic" sets up its own account.  Second, gains 
receive positive account entries and losses receive nega-
tive account entries.  Third, the larger the gain or loss, 
the larger the absolute value of the account entry.  
Fourth, a person who chooses between different action 
alternatives chooses the one that will introduce the most 
positive (or least negative) change judged against the 
mental account as a reference.  We call this view of 
mental accounting discrete, because an event with a 
particular value is either placed entirely into an account 
or it is not. 
 
The Goals-Representativeness Model 
 
In order to address the gaps in the mental accounting 
model, we suggest two extensions to the discrete view.  
First, we suggest that accounts are set up relative to the 
goals that are active during the choice situation.  Second, 
each entry into an account is then weighted by the repre-
sentativeness of the event to the goal that defines the 
account.  Because the value of an event will vary as a 
function of the representativeness of the event to an 
active goal, we will refer to this view as the continuous 
mental accounting view. 
 
Goals as Definitions of Mental Accounts 
 
An important issue in mental accounting involves the 
creation of mental accounts (Heath, 1995; Heath & Soll, 
1996; Henderson & Peterson, 1992).2  We propose that 
topical accounts are organized around active goals.  In 
particular, mental accounts can be viewed as categories 
that allow events in the choice domain to be classified.  
These categories cannot be fixed entities within a rigid 
taxonomic structure, because accounts are often set up 
quickly in novel choice scenarios like the calculator and 
                                                          
2 There is also some research suggesting that events are li-
kely to be combined when they have the same valence, and 
segregated when they have opposite valence (Linville & Fi-
scher, 1991; Thaler & Johnson, 1990), but this research seems 
focused primarily on how evaluations of events are combined 
once they have been placed into one mental account. 
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jacket example above.  Rather, these categories resemble 
the goal-derived categories discussed by Barsalou 
(1991), who points out that a potentially limitless num-
ber of categories are goal-derived.  These categories are 
not derived "bottom-up" via exemplars that are seen, but 
rather they are established "top-down" through concep-
tual combination to achieve current and novel goals.  
Many goal-derived categories are constructed on the spot 
because they are needed to reach goals that are novel, 
such as "ways to escape being killed by the Mafia" or 
"activities to do on a vacation in Japan with one's 
grandmother" (cf. Barsalou, 1991).  Of course, a goal-
derived category that is used frequently may be stored in 
memory. 
Barsalou (1991) showed that variability in the judged 
typicality of exemplars of a taxonomic category (e.g., 
fruit or chair) is well explained by the similarity of the 
exemplar to the central tendency of the category.  In 
contrast, the variability in typicality of exemplars of a 
goal-derived category (e.g., diet foods) is explained by 
their similarity to an ideal that supports the fulfillment of 
the central goals of the category (e.g., an ideal diet food 
tastes great and has no calories).  Further, Barsalou finds 
that both taxonomic categories and goal-derived catego-
ries have a graded typicality structure with some exem-
plars that are good members of the category and some 
exemplars that are poor members.  Thus, even categories 
that are derived on line behave like categories that al-
ready exist in the cognitive system.  The facility of the 
cognitive system in constructing ad hoc categories 
strongly suggests that mental accounts can be set up on 
the fly as new events occur. 
We propose that topical accounts are goal-derived 
categories as described by Barsalou (1991).  For exam-
ple, it is because of the active goal to visit the theater 
that people construct a mental "theater ticket" account. 
We must stress that topical accounts are set up on the 
basis of active goals, which then serve as references for 
inferring whether an account entry is positive or negative 
(see Brendl & Higgins, 1996).  In most normal circum-
stances, losing a theater ticket is perceived as having a 
negative valence, but if one has the goal of not seeing a 
particular play, then the lost ticket will be perceived as 
having positive valence.  Thus, the valence associated 
with an object is not an inherent attribute of the object, 
but rather is determined in relation to an individual's 
active goals. A goal is activated by setting it (Gollwitzer, 
1993) and is deactivated by reaching it (cf. Lewin, 1926; 
Ovsiankina, 1928; Zeigarnik, 1927). 
If mental accounts are organized around active goals, 
then we must examine the nature of goals in order to 
better understand the structure of mental accounts.  In 
accord with previous work, we assume that goals can 
vary in their level of abstraction (Hoppe, 1931; Miller, 
Galanter, & Pribram, 1960; Powers, 1973; Vallacher & 
Wegner, 1985).  Abstract goals involve abstract means 
and end-states.  For example, a gambler might have an 
abstract goal of maximizing cash through gambling.  
More specific goals involve more specific means and 
end-states.  For example, a gambler might have the spe-
cific goal of winning $50 in a particular gamble being 
offered.  Goals are also hierarchically organized, with 
abstract superordinate goals connected to more specific 
subordinate goals that facilitate them.  In the example 
above, the specific goal of winning $50 in a particular 
gamble might be subordinate to that gambler's su-
perordinate goal of maximizing cash through gambling. 
The hierarchical structure of goals is important to the 
mental accounting framework, because we would expect 
to observe the integration of events when topical ac-
counts are set up by superordinate goals.  If a gambler 
organizes a mental account only around subordinate 
goals, then (s)he will not take past gains or losses into 
consideration when assessing a new gamble.  In contrast, 
if that gambler organizes a mental account around a 
superordinate goal, then other actions that were per-
formed in service of that goal will also be integrated into 
that mental account, and hence will affect the decision.  
Thus, from the goals-representativeness perspective, 
mental accounting phenomena imply that people are 
constructing mental accounts using superordinate goals.  
This assumption is consistent with evidence that people 
generally prefer to identify the goals related to their 
actions at a level of abstraction more general than the 
most specific level (Vallacher & Wegner, 1985, 1987).   
This view of mental accounting emphasizes that ac-
tive goals involve committing resources to them.  In this 
sense, mental accounting is a special case of a general 
self-regulatory strategy in goal-striving.  Pursuing a goal 
requires protecting it from competing goals (Kuhl, 
1986), which can be accomplished by committing re-
sources (e.g., money, attention, effort) to that goal rather 
than to others.  Mental accounting may be a form of 
what Kuhl called ”encoding control”, which involves a 
selective encoding of perceptual input to protect the 
target goal (e.g., by encoding money as being associated 
with a to be protected goal rather than with a competing 
goal).  We will pursue the relationship between mental 
accounting and other self-regulatory strategies below. 
 
Representativeness as a Source for Weights of 
Account Entries 
 
Not only are goals important for setting up topical ac-
counts, they are also crucial for determining the weight 
given to an account entry.  An event is entered positively 
into an account if it supports the goal used to create the 
account, and it is entered negatively if it impedes the 
goal used to create the account. The magnitude of the 
account entry is proportional to the representativeness of 
the event to the goal setting up the account.3  According 
to Tversky and Kahneman  
 
Representativeness is a relation between a process 
                                                          
3 The magnitude of the event itself is also proportional to 
the entry (e.g., winning $500 has a greater magnitude when 
entered into an account set up by the goal to maximize cash 
than does winning $50).  However, a discussion of the interve-
ning judgmental process involved in translating the magnitude 
of the event into account entries is beyond the scope of this 
paper. 
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or a model, M, and some instance or event, X, asso-
ciated with that model.  Representativeness, like 
similarity, can be assessed empirically, for example, 
by asking people to judge which of two events, X1 
or X2, is more representative of some model, M, or 
whether an event, X, is more representative of M1 
or of M2. (Tversky & Kahneman, 1982b, p. 85)  
 
In the general case, representativeness involves as-
sessing the similarity of an item to a general category 
that is important for making an inference about that item 
(e.g., Kahneman, Slovic, & Tversky, 1982;Kahneman & 
Tversky, 1972, 1973; Nisbett & Ross, 1980; Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1974, 1982b).4  For example, in the famous 
lawyer-engineer problem, people judge the likelihood 
that a person is an engineer to be higher when the target 
person is more rather than less similar to the prototypical 
engineer while making little use of other information 
such as base-rates (Kahneman & Tversky, 1973). Typi-
cally, the representativeness heuristic has been used to 
explain judgments of frequency and probability5.   
From the goals-representativeness perspective, when 
an event is to be entered into an account, the representa-
tiveness of the event to the goal setting up the account is 
first determined.  An event can be representative of a 
goal in many ways.  The event may involve a means that 
is typically used to carry out the goal.  For example, a 
theater ticket is more representative of the goal of seeing 
a play than is cash.  An event may also be representative 
of a goal if the end-state yielded by the event is similar 
to the end-state of the goal.  For example, a gamble that 
pays cash is more representative of maximizing cash 
through gambling than is a gamble that pays chips.  The 
more representative an event is of the goal that sets up 
the account, the greater the weight it will receive when 
entered into that account.  For example, a previous loss 
of a theater ticket will receive more (negative) weight in 
a theater account than a previous loss of cash, because 
the ticket is more representative of seeing a play than is 
cash.  An important implication of this hypothesis is that 
mental accounts are continuous and not discrete (Hen-
derson & Peterson, 1992).  Thus, an item can be entered 
into an account to varying degrees. 
For the sake of completeness, we must distinguish be-
tween two ways to think about the weighting of events.  
One possibility is that events have a particular absolute 
value, and a certain amount of that value is entered into a 
particular mental account as a function of the representa-
tiveness of that event to the active goal that sets up the 
                                                          
4 Current models of similarity suggest that the perceived 
similarity of a pair increases with its commonalities and dec-
reases with its differences (Gentner & Markman, 1997; 
Tversky, 1977). 
5 Gigerenzer (1991) has criticized the use of the representa-
tiveness heuristic to explain judgments of frequency and pro-
bability. He argues that representativeness means likelihood in 
the context of the lawyer-engineer problem and can therefore 
not be used to explain judgments of likelihood. This criticism 
does not apply to the goals-representativeness model, which 
does not involve likelihood judgments.  
account.  This view is analogous to actual accounting 
practice, in which a material charge can be spread across 
many different accounts if that charge reflects funds 
spent in service of the topic of those accounts.  The sum 
of the account entries would equal the total charge.  On 
this view, if only part of the value of an event is entered 
into one account, then the additional value of that event 
is 'left over' and must be entered into one (or more) other 
accounts in order to balance the mental books.  A second 
possibility (and one we favor) is that the actual value of 
an event is determined by its representativeness to an 
active goal.  Thus, the amount entered into a mental 
account is typically the entire value of that event.  
Unlike real accounting, where an objective value must 
be placed on the books, in mental accounting, the value 
to be accounted is subjective, and is determined with 
reference to active goals.  Thus, the perceived value of 
an event varies with the representativeness of the event 
to an active goal. 
In sum, we suggest that a mental account is set up by 
an active goal that determines the content of the account, 
and that the representativeness of events to goals affects 
the weight of account entries.  
 
Evidence for Representativeness in Mental Accounting 
 
Research on mental accounting has begun to address 
the proposal that mental accounts are continuous rather 
than discrete (Heath, 1995; Heath & Soll, 1996; Hender-
son & Peterson, 1992; Linville & Fischer, 1991).  Many 
of these studies involve decisions about consumer prod-
ucts, and thus they speak to the role of mental account-
ing in consumer behavior.  In one line of work, Linville 
and Fischer (1991, p. 11) suggested that the likelihood 
that two events will be combined increases with the 
degree to which they can substitute for one another.  
Substitutability is assumed to be a continuous function.  
According to Linville and Fischer this substitutability, in 
turn, may depend on the similarity of the two events.  
Consistent with this assumption, Lewin (1935) found the 
substitutability of two actions is related to their similar-
ity.  However, he explicitly points out that it is not the 
similarity of two actions that determines their substitut-
ability, but rather their similarity to the underlying goal.  
Thus, his findings are quite consistent with our proposal 
that weights in mental accounts are derived by the repre-
sentativeness of entries to goal-derived mental accounts. 
More direct evidence for the continuity of mental ac-
counts comes from Henderson and Peterson (1992) who 
gave participants various sources of money and asked 
them to rank order them relative to different uses.  For 
example, a money gift was rated as the first to be entered 
in a mental consumption account, but only fourth to be 
entered in a mental investment account.  This observa-
tion is consistent with a money gift being a better mem-
ber of a consumption account than of an investment 
account, although it leaves open why these different rank 
orders are observed. 
Further research addresses this point.  Heath and Soll 
(1996) had participants consider various kinds of enter-
tainment.  Their participants considered sports events to 
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be most typical of entertainment, party snacks least 
typical, and roller-skate rentals intermediate between the 
two.  When participants imagined that they had already 
purchased an entertainment item, they indicated that this 
purchase would decrease the amount of money they 
would spend for this category during that week.  The 
degree of this reduction for the prior purchase increased 
as the typicality of the purchase to the general goal cate-
gory "entertainment" increased.  Thus, the purchase of a 
ticket for a sports event reduced participants’ willingness 
to make further entertainment purchases that week more 
than did the purchase of party snacks for the same 
amount of money.  In the aggregate data this increase 
was continuous over the three levels of typicality.  
This finding suggests that items that are highly typical 
of a category are given more weight than items that are 
less typical.  In this way, the purchase of a typical item 
brings the total account balance down to a lower value 
than does the purchase of a less typical item, and thus 
makes additional expenditures less likely.  This pattern 
of data is consistent with the goals-representativeness 
model.  In contrast, the discrete model of mental ac-
counting cannot predict that one item is given more 
weight than a second but less weight than a third in a 
mental account.  These findings further support Heath 
and Soll’s prediction that judgments of similarity of a 
type of expense to the type of account affect the degree 
to which the expense is weighed in the account.  
Further evidence that the weight an entry is given in a 
mental account is related to its representativeness (or 
typicality) is provided by Brendl, Higgins, and Markman 
(1997, Study 1).  In a within-participants vignette, par-
ticipants judged the likelihood that students visiting a 
gambling casino would accept a gamble for a cash prize 
after losing a previous gamble.  These students are ex-
pected to have the goal of maximizing cash during the 
gambling day, and so the mental account is assumed to 
be organized around this goal.  The stake the students 
had lost in the previous gamble was either a gambling 
chip (rated as least similar to cash), a winnings check 
(rated as intermediate between cash and a gambling chip 
in its similarity to cash), or cash (which is most "similar" 
to cash). 
Consistent with the goals-representativeness model, 
participants rated the student who lost a gambling chip in 
the previous gamble as most likely to gamble again, the 
student who lost cash as least likely to gamble again, and 
the student who lost a winnings check as intermediate 
between the other two students in willingness to gamble 
again.  This result is consistent with the use of gambling 
chips rather than cash in casinos.  In sum, according to 
goals-representativeness, the more representative a pre-
vious loss was of cash, the more negatively it was en-
tered into the mental "maximize cash through gambling" 
account and the less likely a student was judged to gam-
ble again. One might suggest an alternative explanation 
for these findings, namely that people generally avoid 
cash losses.  Note, however, that this interpretation can 
be ruled out by the fact that participants jugded the win-
nings-check student to be less likely to gamble than the 
gambling chip student.  
The previous finding has also been obtained in a be-
tween-subjects design with real choices rather than simu-
lated choices (Brendl et al., 1997, Study 2) .  Upon arri-
val in the laboratory each participant received an unex-
pected payment of $13.50, either in cash or in gambling 
tickets which could be exchanged for cash at the end of 
the experiment.  Participants were offered several gam-
bles in which they could win cash.  Again, participants 
should have a cash account because they wanted to 
maximize the amount of cash they could take home from 
the experiment.  Each gamble cost a fee which partici-
pants had to pay from their initial $13.50 stake.  Pilot 
research established that gambling tickets (like gambling 
chips) are less representative of the cash account than is 
cash.  Thus, compared to losing cash, losing gambling 
tickets should receive less negative weight in the cash 
account.  Accordingly, participants spent considerably 
more on gambling when risking gambling tickets than 
when risking cash. 
In the previous experiment it could be argued that 
people gamble more with gambling tickets than with 
cash, because they are following a conversational norm 
that the purpose of gambling tickets is gambling, while 
the primary purpose of cash is not gambling (for effects 
of conversational norms on judgement see Bless, Strack, 
& Schwarz, 1993; Fiedler, Semin, & Bolton, 1989; 
Schwarz, 1994; Strack & Martin, 1987; Hilton, 1995). 
On this objection, participants are assuming that the 
experimenter has given them gambling tickets because 
she expects them to gamble.  In order to provide evi-
dence against this interpretation, we conducted the fol-
lowing two studies.  In the first study, we pit an option 
that should be selected by a conversational norm against 
another option that should be selected by goals-
representativeness.  To this end, we substituted a win-
nings check for a gambling ticket.  If anything, a win-
nings-check should be perceived as an item to keep and 
take home rather than an instrument for gambling.  Thus, 
if a conversational norm were responsible for the above 
effects, people should gamble less with a winnings-
check than with cash. University of Konstanz students 
(N = 62) read the following vignette (with orders of the 
described actors being counterbalanced between-
participants). 
 
Two college students are visiting a gambling casino.  
Each has won $25 in the same gamble.  Student A 
received a winnings-check that he can cash at any 
time and student B received cash. 
 
Now, student A considers whether he should partici-
pate in the following gamble:  He would have to put 
his $25 winnings-check on the gambling table.  The 
chance of losing is 50%, the chance of winning is 
also 50%.  If he loses, his $25 winnings-check goes 
to the casino.  If he wins, he gets $25 in cash and 
gets back his $25 winnings-check from the table.  
 
Student B considers participating in this same gam-
ble as well. He would, however, have to put his $25 
in cash on the table. If he loses, his $25 cash go to 
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the casino.  If he wins, he gets $25 in cash and gets 
back his $25 stake from the table.  
 
In your opinion, who is more likely to accept this 
gamble? 
 
Please circle: Student A Student B 
 (N = 39) (N = 23) 
 
The student who would have to risk a winnings check 
was judged as most likely to gamble by more people 
(N=39) than the student who would have to risk the cash 
(N = 23) χ 2 (1, N = 62) = 4.13, p < .05.  This finding is 
consistent with goals-representativeness, which suggests 
that if participants hold the goal of maximizing cash 
through gambling, then lost cash (which is more similar 
to cash than is a winnings check) will be given more 
weight in the mental account than a winnings check.  A 
larger negative weight will, of course, reduce willingness 
to gamble. Thus, this result is consistent with goals-
representativeness but inconsistent with a conversational 
norms explanation. The next vignette reinforces this 
point. 
Forty-six Columbia University students read the fol-
lowing vignette.  They judged the likelihood of gam-
bling after having paid a fee either with cash or with a 
check.  In this vignette, the students each find $25 in 
cash prior to paying the fee.  In this way, the students 
from both alternatives start the gambling session with the 
same amount of money they had at the start of the vi-
gnette. 
 
Imagine two college students are visiting a gambling 
casino.  In front of the casino each student finds $25 
cash and puts the money in his wallet.  Each student 
pays the $25 entrance fee to enter the casino.  Stu-
dent A pays with check and student B pays with 
cash. 
 
Neither student has decided yet whether to gamble 
or not.  Both students consider the following gam-
ble:  You put $25 in cash on the gambling table.  
You have a 50% chance of losing and a 50% chance 
of winning.  If you lose, your money goes to the ca-
sino.  If you win, you get $25 in cash in addition to 
getting back the $25 you put on the table.  
In your opinion, who is more likely to accept this 
gamble? 
 
Please circle: Student A Student B 
 (N = 32) (N = 14) 
 
The student who paid the fee with cash was judged 
less likely to accept the gamble (N = 14) than the student 
who paid the fee with check (N = 32), χ 2 (1, N = 46) = 
7.04, p < .01.  Again, if participants hold a goal of 
maximizing cash, then a cash payment is more similar to 
the cash goal than a check payment.  Therefore, the cash 
payment receives a more negative weight in the account 
than the check payment.  Thus, the overall account bal-
ance is more negative (or less positive) for the "cash fee" 
student than for the "check fee" student.  Consequently, 
the "cash fee" student should be less likely to gamble 
than the "check fee" student. Again, this result is pre-
dicted by goals-representativeness.  In this case, an ex-
planation based on conversational norms has no basis for 
favoring one option over the other.6   
Although the previous studies have demonstrated ef-
fects of representativeness on the weighting of account 
entries with different kinds of accounts (e.g., cash, enter-
tainment, sports), the account entries were always 
money.  These effects are not restricted to cases where 
the entries are money, however.  In a study by Heath 
(1995, Study 5), participants imagined that they had 
already invested some time in a consulting project that 
they believed would save them 21.5 hours on a second 
project.  Finishing this first consulting project would 
then require a second investment of either time (i.e., 
putting in more hours) or money (e.g., purchasing 
equipment).  When the initial time investment came 
close to the amount of time the project was expected to 
save (e.g., 17.5 hours), the likelihood that participants 
would choose to finish off the project with a money 
investment rather than a time investment was greater 
than if the initial investment was much less than the 
expected time savings (e.g., 5.3 hours).  The opposite 
pattern was observed when the project budgets were 
described in terms of money.  In this case, an initial 
expenditure that was close to the expected payoff (e.g., 
$123 on a project expected to return $150) made people 
more likely to invest additional time than additional 
money relative to a situation in which the initial expendi-
ture was far from the expected payoff (e.g., $37 on a 
project expected to return $150).   
The goals-representativeness model suggests that 
when the initial investment and the necessary second 
investment threaten to eat up the expected payoff (ex-
pressed in hours or dollars), people try to minimize the 
value of the negative account entry of the second in-
vestment by choosing it in a format that is not weighed 
as heavily into the project account.  If the account cur-
rency is time, then a money investment, being "less 
similar to time than time", is weighed less heavily into 
the time account than a money investment. If the account 
currency is money, then a time investment, being less 
similar to money than money, is weighed less heavily 
into the account than a money investment.  This effect is 
particularly prominent when the additional investment 
threatens to violate the goal that sets up the account.  
The above finding suggests that investments in a format 
other than that specified in the goal that defines a the 
mental account are weighed less heavily than invest-
ments in the same format as that specified in the goal. 
In sum, the data we reviewed suggest that the discrete 
version of the mental accounting view needs to be aug-
mented to permit continuous mental accounts (Heath, 
                                                          
6 It is not crucial that the imaginary students both find cash 
in front of the casino. We added this phrase so that the imagi-
nary students would have "psychologically" free access to the 
casino.  This was supposed to act against the thought: if people 
pay a fee to get into a casino, they will play at least once. 
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1995; Heath & Soll, 1996; Henderson & Peterson, 
1992). Further, the above results are consistent with our 
proposal that people weight entries into accounts accord-
ing to the entries’ representativeness of the account. 
Thus, representativeness provides a process by which 
events are assigned to accounts. 
 
Evidence for Goal-Derived Accounts 
 
In the previous section we focused on evidence for the 
proposal that people determine the weight of a mental 
account entry from the representativeness of the entry to 
the account.  In this section, we focus on the prediction 
that mental accounts are organized by active goals.  If 
mental accounts are set up by active goals, then we 
should be able to observe typical characteristics of goal 
striving in mental accounting: In both mental accounting 
and goal-striving people track events that are positive or 
negative and integrate them into an evaluation of a situa-
tion that goes beyond the mere act decided upon.  In goal 
striving, for example, individuals evaluate how much 
closer (or further away) a decision will bring them to 
their goal while taking into account how close other 
decisions have brought them already.  Similarly, in men-
tal accounting individuals integrate the costs of a previ-
ously lost theater ticket with a newly bought one.  In 
goal striving, the means for reaching a goal are per-
ceived as causes for reaching the goal (Vallacher & 
Wegner, 1985), and often they involve a psychological 
cost, such as effort.  This cost needs to be invested and 
integrated with the expected benefit of reaching the goal.  
Similarly, in mental accounting when a cost is seen as 
causally related to a benefit, the cost and benefit are 
more likely to be integrated into the same mental ac-
count (Hirst, Joyce, & Schadewald, 1994). Further, in 
goal striving people track how supportive or hindering 
events are for their goal only until they have reached the 
goal (cf. Lewin, 1926; Ovsiankina, 1928).  The analogy 
in mental accounting is that when people purchase a 
product whose usefulness has a certain duration, such as 
a car, they prefer to account the cost (e.g., a loan) with 
the same duration rather than with a longer duration 
(Hirst et al., 1994).  We suggest that this is the case 
because the cost is seen as a means, that is, a cause of 
obtaining use of the product, and events are more easily 
identified as causes when they precede an effect than 
when they follow it (cf. Tversky & Kahneman, 1982a; 
1982b).  
We performed a test of the hypothesis that only men-
tal accounts with active goals accept new entries.  In this 
study, Columbia University students (N = 51) read the 
following vignette and indicated which of two students 
would be more (or less) likely to gamble. The "more 
versus less" question did not affect judgments and thus 
results are presented in terms of the "more question". 
Also counterbalancing the presentation order of the two 
students did not affect the results. 
 
Imagine two college students are visiting a gambling 
casino.  In front of the casino student A finds $25 
cash and puts the money in his wallet.  Student A 
and student B pay the $25 entrance fee and enter the 
casino.  Inside the casino student B finds $25 cash 
and puts the money in his wallet. 
 
Both students do not know yet whether to gamble or 
not.  Both students consider the following gamble:  
You put $25 on the gambling table.  You have a 
50% chance of losing and a 50% chance of winning.  
If you lose, your money goes to the casino.  If you 
win, you get $25 in cash in addition to getting back 
the $25 you put on the table.  
 
In your opinion, who is more likely to accept this 
gamble? 
 
Please circle: Student A Student B 
 (N = 14) (N = 37) 
 
The student who finds the cash first and pays the fee 
afterwards was judged to accept the next gamble less 
often (N = 14) than the student who pays the fee first and 
finds the cash afterwards (N = 37), χ 2  (1, N = 51) = 
10.37, p < .002.  This result supports the hypothesis that 
entries are assigned to an account only as long as the 
account’s goal is active. The student who finds the 
money first and then pays the fee is presumably seen as 
using the found money for paying the fee.  By paying the 
fee, the student has discharged a goal with the found 
money.  This money cannot then be applied to newly 
activated goals.  In contrast, the student who finds the 
money after paying the fee can assign it to an account set 
up by the now activated goal of gambling.  Thus, this 
study suggests that a mental account only accepts entries 
when the goal that sets up the account is active. 
The study by Heath (1995) described above in which 
students either invested in a consulting project with a 
money or with a time payoff supports the hypothesis that 
representativeness judgments are made relative to active 
goals. We suggest that expecting a payoff in time versus 
money triggers a goal to gain time versus money. Ac-
cordingly, when the expected time payoff was threat-
ened, and consequently reaching the time goal was 
threatened, preferences for investing in money instead of 
time rose.  This result was reversed when the expected 
payoff and the goal was a cash profit.  
The previous two studies can be criticized on the 
grounds that participants only mentally simulated their 
goals.  In the following study, however, a naturalistic 
priming manipulation was employed to manipulate di-
rectly the activation of a bill-paying goal. We expected 
that when the bill-paying goal is active, events that are 
more representative of bill-paying are weighted more 
heavily into a bill-paying account.  Brendl et al. (1997, 
Study 3)  gave Columbia University students on campus 
the following questionnaire (the between-participants 
condition is printed in brackets): 
 
Imagine the university was introducing a new meas-
ure to improve its financial situation: a university 
lottery.   Out of all participants 10 would receive a 
$1000 cash award [waiver applicable to any univer-
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sity bill (e.g. to tuition or rent)] and you could find 
out whether you have a winning ticket right away. 
 
We would like to know how much you would 
maximally pay for a ticket, if I offered one to you 
right now. 
 
Both the cash and bill waiver conditions were given to 
students in two locations: students who were lining up at 
the bursar in order to pay their university bills, and stu-
dents who were sitting at various campus cafeterias.  For 
the bursar participants, the goal of paying their bills was 
presumably highly active and they should have been 
more likely to represent the lottery in a bill-paying ac-
count. For the cafeteria participants, the goal of paying a 
bill was presumably less active and thus they should 
have been less likely to represent the lottery in a bill-
paying account. It follows from goals-representativeness 
that the bursar participants should weigh the bill-waiver 
more positively than the cafeteria participants because 
the bill-waiver is more representative of bill paying than 
is the cash award.  Consistent with our expectations, the 
bursar participants indicated that they would pay more 
for a bill waiver ticket than for a cash award ticket.  In 
contrast, the cafeteria participants indicated that they 
would pay less for a bill waiver ticket than for a cash 
award ticket. 
Note that the objective value of the two awards was 
the same.  Both $1000 in cash, and a $1000 bill waiver 
can be used to pay a bursar bill. Therefore, at the bursar 
location there is no obvious reason why people should 
value bill waivers more than cash. If anything, it could 
be argued that people should always prefer a money 
award, because money is fungible, and a bill waiver is 
not.7 This study and the Heath (1995; Heath & Soll, 
1996) studies also provide further evidence that the 
results showing a reluctance of people to risk cash stem 
from the representativeness of cash to an active cash 
goal rather than from a general preference for cash.  
In sum, there is evidence consistent with the proposals 
that mental accounts are set up by currently active goals 
and that account entries are based on the representative-
ness of the entries to the account-defining goal.  Further, 
this evidence comes from a diverse set of studies that 
varied different kinds of goals (cash maximization, time 
profits, bill paying), included goals that people actually 
held, and manipulated goal activation in different ways 
(time sequence of event and goal-fulfillment, mentally 
simulated goal content, experimental activation of 
goals).  The available evidence is strongly consistent 
with the goals-representativeness model of mental ac-
counting. 
 
Mental accounting and other forms of goal-
striving? 
 
At the outset, we suggested that mental accounting 
might be an important self-regulatory strategy in which 
people protect important goals from other competing 
                                                          
7 We thank Chip Heath for pointing out this issue to us. 
goals by committing resources to them.  This strategy is 
important, because competing action tendencies tend to 
wax and wane for a variety of reasons (cf. Atkinson & 
Birch, 1970), and only a few (perhaps only one) (Simon, 
1994) goal can be enacted at once.  Thus, there is a dan-
ger that important goals could fail to be enacted because 
of short-term activation of competing goals.  As an illus-
tration, Shefrin and Thaler (1992)  examined the conflict 
between immediate consumption of income and saving 
for retirement.  Shefrin and Thaler suggest that mental 
accounting serves as a self-control strategy by pre-
committing money for future purposes.  By paying into a 
deferred compensation program like a pension, for ex-
ample, people commit money to a mental account that 
will ensure their income during retirement.  This strategy 
protects their future income goal from immediate and 
highly tempting consumption goals.   
Research on delay of gratification provides an exam-
ple of a similar self-regulatory strategy in another do-
main of goal striving (Mischel, Shoda, & Rodriguez, 
1989).  Analogous to the consumption versus pension 
conflict, small children are placed in the conflict of 
either immediately consuming a small reward (e.g., one 
marshmallow) or waiting an unspecified time to con-
sume a larger reward (e.g., two marshmallows).  Like the 
consumption hungry adults, who have their income at 
their immediate disposal, these children have the small 
reward at their immediate disposal sitting right in front 
of them on a table.  When the children are told to think 
of the rewards as a picture, they can wait for the larger 
reward much longer than children who are not instructed 
in this encoding strategy.  Apparently, like mental ac-
countants who encode money as usable for a pension 
plan rather than for immediate consumption, these chil-
dren encode the reward as only a picture rather than 
usable for consumption.  This effect may be due to chil-
dren's inability to view an object as both an object and a 
representation (e.g., a picture) at the same time 
(DeLoache and Burns, 1994). Thus, thinking about the 
immediate reward as a picture makes it less likely that it 
will be seen as satisfying the goal of eating a treat. 
These encoding strategies may serve other functions 
besides protecting long-term goals from more tempting 
short-term goals.  As an example in a consumer choice 
setting, we can consider a mental ”vacation” account.  
By setting money aside for vacations, people might be 
able to enjoy their vacation without having to torment 
themselves about having violated other monetary goals, 
such as accumulating assets. As a second example, con-
sider why one might not buy a second theater ticket after 
losing the first one.  Perhaps mental accounting here 
leads to less consumption, because the price of the two 
tickets violates a goal of purchasing only reasonably 
priced goods, rather than because the money has been 
pre-committed to some specific alternative account.  
Thus, the function of mental accounting goes beyond 
being able to resist the temptation of immediate con-
sumption, and may serve as a general mechanism for 
budgeting limited resources (see also Heath, 1995). 
Simon (1956) suggested: ”Common denominators 
among needs may simply not exist, or may exist only in 
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very rudimentary form...” (p.137).  Mental accounts may 
make a comparison of gains and losses across different 
needs or goals unnecessary because they first select 
which gains and losses are to be considered and simply 
ignore the rest. 
In sum, goals-representativeness suggests that mental 
accounting is the result of an adaptive self-regulatory 
process that is aimed at protecting one goal from com-
peting goals. It could be adaptive because humans, being 
unable to maximize a single utility goal in the way sug-
gested by formal economic models, need strategies that 
permit efficient behavior with their limited resources. 
Whether mental accounting is adaptive must be decided 
by assessing its efficiency within the environment where 
it is actually used to make choices (cf. Gigerenzer & 
Goldstein, 1996; Simon, 1956). Securing long-term 
goals certainly seems to be advantageous.  This does not 
mean that mental accounting cannot lead to some sub-
optimal choices (e.g., preference reversals occur in the 
theater ticket problem [Tversky and Kahneman, 1981] or 
in the bursar-bill study [Brendl et al., 1997]). It  rather 
means that mental accounting is generally reasonable. 
 
Some Effects of Mental Accounting 
 on Choice Behavior 
 
Economists agree that rational decision makers should 
only consider incremental losses and gains; that is, they 
should not factor past losses (i.e., sunk costs) or gains 
into the evaluation of their choice options (Laughhunn & 
Payne, 1984; Thaler & Johnson, 1990). It is well docu-
mented, however, that people often include past losses 
and gains in their decisions, which suggests that mental 
accounting is at work. As a classic example, participants 
are asked to imagine that they are the president of an 
airline company, and they have to decide whether to 
invest 1 million dollars into the development of a new 
plane for which a competitor already has an advantage. 
Most participants in this case decide they would not 
invest the money in this project.  If they are told that 
they have already invested 9 million dollars in the pro-
ject, however, most participants in studies that have used 
this example decide that they would invest the money 
into this project, presumably because they do not want to 
waste the 9 million dollars already invested (Arkes & 
Blumer, 1985).  Although such behavior is common-
place with large public investments it is irrational, be-
cause it throws good money after bad money.  Appar-
ently, people integrate the previously invested money, 
the money to be invested, and the money to be gained in 
one mental account. According to the goals-
representativeness model, attending to sunk costs should 
be more likely when the prior losses are more 
representative of an active goal than when they are not. 
Sunk costs, and thus mental accounting, are thought to 
influence not only financial decisions but also 
persistence at an activity and commitment to 
relationships (cf. Rusbult, 1980).8 
                                                          
8 As Tan and Yates (1995) point out, however, it is not al-
ways clear how to evaluate a choice situation in which previous 
A related phenomenon is called entrapment (Brockner 
& Rubin, 1985) and escalation of commitment (Staw & 
Ross, 1987). Here people typically keep making small 
investments in the hopes of reaching the final goal (but 
see McCain, 1986, for limits on this effect). Thaler and 
Johnson (1990) suggest that people are reluctant to close 
a mental account with a negative balance.  In Thaler and 
Johnson’s (1985)  ”break-even effect”, for example, 
people are more willing to accept a gamble that follows 
an initial loss when the gamble’s potential gain could 
cancel out the initial loss.  In sunk cost and entrapment 
research, it is usually implicit that the investments can 
improve or at least justify one’s previous losses, suggest-
ing a break-even component in these situations. Goals-
representativeness cannot predict when an initial loss 
will make subsequent behavior risk-seeking or risk-
averse (but see, e.g., Heath, 1995; Thaler & Johnson, 
1990). However, it can predict the likelihood that a 
previous loss will affect a subsequent choice, because 
these phenomena presuppose inclusion of the previous 
loss and the subsequent decision into one mental ac-
count. 
There are also cases for which previously experienced 
gains make people more risk seeking, as in the house-
money effect (Thaler & Johnson, 1990). In a study by 
Arkes et al. (1994), for example, student participants 
were given money that they could use for gambling.  
Those participants who knew ahead of time that they 
would receive this money risked less money in actual 
gambles than those who did not expect to receive the 
money. These latter participants were presumably more 
surprised by receiving this extra money, and thus they 
were more likely to assign this money to a mental gam-
bling account.  This assignment made any loss in the 
subsequent gambling less painful because the gambling 
account started at a positive balance. From a goals-
representativeness perspective this result resembles the 
studies described earlier suggesting that events are as-
signed only to accounts with active goals. The students 
who knew ahead of time that they would receive money 
were more likely to assign that money to other active 
goals. In contrast, the goal of gambling was much more 
active for the students who were surprised by receiving 
the money, and thus the money was assigned more read-
ily to the gambling account.  This explanation parallels 
the one we gave earlier for the study in which students 
found money either before or after paying a fee to enter 
a casino. 
Of course, prior gains or losses are not the only situa-
tions in which mental accounting is relevant to consumer 
choice.  Shefrin and Thaler (1992) , for example, suggest 
that the typical household divides its wealth into three 
                                                                                        
investments have been made.  In many manufacturing situati-
ons, committing additional resources to complete the develop-
ment of a product that has been determined to be inferior to one 
already on the market can still lead to a net gain for the compa-
ny.  In particular, the additional investment needed to bring the 
inferior product to market can lead to sales that help the com-
pany recoup some of the initial investment.  
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mental accounts that involve decreasing temptations to 
spend money.  Spendable income has the highest tempta-
tion, current assets fall in the middle, and future income 
has the lowest temptation. Shefrin and Thaler state: 
”People tend to consume from income and leave per-
ceived 'wealth‘ alone. The larger is a windfall [income], 
the more wealthlike it becomes, and the more likely it 
will be included in the less tempting assets account.” (p. 
321). Shefrin and Thaler report evidence by Landsberger 
(1966) that bears on this point: Israeli recipients of Ger-
man restitution payments were less likely to spend this 
money on consumption, when the payment was large 
than when the payment was small.  This view is quite 
consistent with goals-representativeness. Presumably a 
goal, such as financial security and the financing of 
expensive endeavors, sets up the assets account. Large 
amounts of money should be perceived as more typical 
of such a goal then small amounts of money, rendering 





For the mental auditor, deciphering Generally Ac-
cepted Mental Accounting Principles will require under-
standing people's goals in choice situations.  Goals play 
two key roles in evaluating new choice situations.  First, 
mental accounts are derived from active goals, so that 
active goals determine which prior events are integrated 
with the current event and which are segregated.  Sec-
ond, events are weighed into these accounts in terms of 
their representativeness of the goal. Viewed from a 
goals-representativeness perspective, mental accounting 
is a reasonable self-regulatory strategy that protects 
active goals, although it can lead to irrational choices in 
some cases. Beyond advancing our theoretical under-
standing of mental accounting, goals-representativeness 
helps us predict the occurrence of previously established 
effects of prior experience on choice, such as use of sunk 
costs or entrapment.  Perhaps most importantly, this 
theoretical framework places mental accounting phe-
nomena into the context of goal-striving.  Thus, rather 
than viewing these phenomena as isolated instances of 
irrational behavior, we should view them as important 
manifestations of the way our self-regulatory system 
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